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On 17 February 2016, WikiLeaks released the first six monthly Report concerning
the performed and planned phases of Eunavfor Med Operation Sophia (Six Monthly
Report).1 This is an ongoing military mission that was recently undertaken by the
European Union (EU) to disrupt the business model of migrant smuggling and
human trafficking networks in the Mediterranean (hereinafter Operation Sophia).2
One of the main challenging elements within the Six Monthly Report is the
planned but still pending transition from the phase involving enforcement actions
on the high seas to the subsequent phase involving the exercise of the same
enforcement actions also in the territorial and internal waters of Libya.3 The
rationale of the entry of naval forces up to the Libyan coastline is to intercept
alleged criminals before they depart.4 And, in effect, the vast majority of
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1See Eunavfor Med Op Sophia (2016)—Six Monthly Report 22 June–31 December 2015. Avail-
able via WikiLeaks https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf.
Accessed 31 May 2016.
2The Operation was initially titled ‘EUNAVFOR MED’ and was subsequently renamed
‘EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA’ after a baby girl who was given birth to by a woman
of Somali origin on a European vessel in the summer months of 2015 after being rescued. See
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the
Southern Central Mediterranean, Official Journal (2015) L 122/31 and Council Decision (cfsp)
2015/1926 of 26 October 2015 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union
military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean Official Journal (2015) L 281/13.
3See the Six Monthly Report, pp. 3 and 18.
4On the need to have forces close to the Libyan shore, see Lehmann (2015).
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undocumented migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (hereinafter generically
referred to as irregular migrants),5 who attempt to cross the Mediterranean sea,
depart from Libya,6 where the volatile government situation and the consequent
inability to control the territory are contributing to facilitate the development of the
two distinct criminal phenomena of migrant smuggling7 and human trafficking.8
These two different phenomena in the hands of transnational criminal networks
share the common feature of exploiting the migratory movements for personal
gains and disregard for human life. In practice, what smugglers and traffickers do
is to offer a transportation service to hundreds of thousands of persons who crossed
many borders already, mainly in African and Middle Eastern countries, and take
advantage of the fact that the only concern of these persons is to flee from their
countries of origin by whatever means possible, accepting the risk of sinking, and,
indeed, many do sink.9
In light of this complex and tragic scenario, this chapter aims to explore the
ambiguity of Operation Sophia, focusing on two sensitive and interrelated aspects:
the use of coercive powers against suspected smugglers and traffickers and the
rescue of migrants carried out by naval forces at sea. To this end, we will first
introduce the operational and legal background in which the EU operates within the
5According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2015 over
80 percent of the irregular migrants came from the world’s top 10 refugee-producing countries,
including Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Iraq. Available via UNHCR http://data.unhcr.org/
mediterranean/regional.php. Accessed 31 May 2016. On the different definitions of ‘irregular
immigrants’, see Trevisanut (2012), pp. 1–22.
6The Six Monthly Report, p. 6.
7Pursuant to Art. 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the
Smuggling of migrants is: ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a
national or a permanent resident’. See the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
New York, 15 November 2000, in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2241, Doc. A/55/383, p. 507.
8Pursuant to Art. 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children, the Trafficking in persons is: ‘the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulner-
ability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs’. See the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2237,
Doc. A/55/383, p. 319.
9By way of example, in October 2013 an overcrowded boat carrying asylum seekers from Eritrea,
Somalia and Ghana capsized within sight of Italy’s shores. Despite the vessel’s stated capacity of
35 passengers, it carried around 500 souls on board that night. For 360 of them, dreams of a better
life away from poverty and war died in the depths of the Mediterranean, see BBC: http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-24440908. Accessed 31 May 2016.
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area of immigration at sea, assessing, in particular, the main relevant characteristics
both of the civilian (Sect. 2.1) and military operations (Sect. 2.2) recently adopted
in the Central Mediterranean Route. As the Operation Sophia’s mandate stipulates
that the activation of its crucial phase in the territorial waters of Libya requires an
authorization of the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) or the
consent of Libya, we will then assess whether and, eventually, under which
conditions military assets are allowed to exercise coercive powers against vessels
suspected of being used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking.10 The
analysis will consider the different legal regimes that may apply in the different
jurisdictional marine areas and, specifically, on the high seas (Sect. 3.1) and in the
territorial sea (Sect. 3.2). Furthermore, since naval forces may be and frequently are
called upon saving human lives at sea,11 we will verify the content and the legal
framework of the positive obligation to render assistance to people in distress at sea
(Sect. 4), as well as the complex risks raised by search and rescue (SAR) interven-
tions and disembarkation procedures, especially when these activities are under-
taken in cooperation with third countries (Sect. 5). The conclusions contain some
remarks on the EU military mission and, more in general, on the role played by the
EU and its Member States in the Mediterranean Sea in order to manage the
phenomenon of irregular immigration by sea (Sect. 6).
2 The Engagement of the EU in SAR Activities: A Missed
Opportunity
For the purpose of managing the Mediterranean migration crisis, a wide number of
different routes have been undertaken at national and European levels. While in the
past immigration control programs were implemented unilaterally and exclusively
by the most affected coastal States, in the last decade an increasing role has been
played by Europe. The following illustrates the relevant background of Frontex
Joint Operations (Sect. 2.1) and of the new EU Operation Sophia (Sect. 2.2).
10The mandate of Operation Sophia refers to ‘human smuggling or trafficking’, whereas the
established terminology in international law for these two criminal phenomena is ‘smuggling of
migrants’ and ‘trafficking of persons’. See Art. 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
and Art. 3 of the Protocol against the Trafficking in Persons, cit.
11On recent salvage operations carried out by military forces, see EEAS: http://www.eeas.europa.
eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/news/index_en.htm. Accessed 31 May 2016.
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2.1 Frontex Joint Operations
Since 2005, the EU has been dealing with migration by sea through the European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
Member States of the European Union (Frontex).12 One of its most important
competences is to plan, coordinate, implement, and evaluate Member States’ border
control and surveillance activities through the so-called Joint Operations at the EU
external borders (sea, land, and air). In the past years, as a result of these operations,
hundreds of irregular migrants, while attempting to cross the European external
maritime border, rather than being saved, have been forced to return to the State
from which they departed or were presumed to have departed.13
The main focus of Frontex Joint Operations remained essentially the same over
the years, but some steps forward toward an increasing engagement in SAR
activities have been slowly undertaken. Rather important in this context is the
adoption of EU Regulation No. 656/2014 (Sea Border Regulation),14 which is the
result of a laborious series of negotiations and institutional issues.15 It replaced
Council Decision 2010/252/EU,16 which was entirely annulled by the European
Court of Justice in September 2012. The provisions laid down in the challenged
Decision contained essential elements of the surveillance of the sea external borders
of the Member States and constituted “a major development” in the Schengen
Borders Code system.17 Moreover, according to the Court of Luxembourg, these
12Frontex was established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union (EU). This Regulation was later amended by the Regulation (EC) No
863/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention
Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and
regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers. It was then amended by the Regulation (EU) No
1168/2011 of 25 October 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the EU.
13On the practice of ‘push-backs’ in the Mediterranean, see the European Court of Human Rights,
Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, Judgment of 23 February 2012; See Borelli and Stanford (2014),
pp. 29–69.
14See Regulation (EU) No. 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the council of 15 May
2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, in Official Journal of the
European Union L 189/93.
15For further considerations on the negotiations and institutional conflicts within the EU, see den
Heijer (2016), pp. 53–71.
16See Council (2010), Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen
Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational
cooperation coordinated by Frontex at the external borders of the Member States of the EU, OJ L
111/20, 04.05.2010.
17The Schengen Borders Code applies to any person crossing the external borders of all EU
countries, except those of the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the internal borders of the
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provisions entailed political choices and questions over fundamental rights. For
these reasons, their adoption must fall “within the responsibilities of the European
Union legislature” and require the ordinary legislative procedure and not the
comitology procedure.18 During the subsequent legislative process that finally
brought to the adoption of the Sea Border Regulation, the Member States have
accepted the EU’s involvement in SAR activities, but only as far as it remains
limited to Frontex Joint Operations.19
The first Joint Operation to which the Sea Border Regulation was applied is the
Operation Triton. It was actually launched in October 2014 in order to solve the
struggle between Italy and the EU over a follow-up to the Italian SAR operation
Mare Nostrum. And, even though the operational area and main activities of Triton
were initially very limited in scope, in the aftermath of two grave shipwrecks in
April 2015, Frontex adopted a new operational plan.20 The latter expanded its
mission with an increased budget, additional assets and an extended operational
area from 30 up to 138 nautical miles south of Lampedusa, almost reaching the
extent that had been covered earlier by Mare Nostrum.21 The expansion of this
Frontex’ operation could be seen as an implicit admission of guilt by the EU for its
deadly policy of retreat and for its passive role toward the frequent drownings. The
Mediterranean Sea has been defined as a firm and fatal dividing border between
“North” and “South”; according to the International Organization for Migration,
since the year 2000, close to 25,000 migrants have perished in the Mediterranean,
making it the world’s deadliest border.22 In practice, however, Triton remained first
and foremost a border control operation, whereas rescue activities continue to be
incidental and a secondary task of this primary mission.
Schengen Area, a border-free area comprising 22 EU countries, along with Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway and Switzerland.
18See Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) (2012), Judgment of 5 September
2012, Case C-355/10, Parliament v Council, par. 65–85. For a comment on the case, see
Andreone (2014).
19See Carrera and den Hertog (2016), pp. 1–20.
20For practicalities on Frontex support to SAR activities, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/
frontex_triton_factsheet_en.pdf.
21On the expiration of Frontex Joint Operation Triton, see Frontex: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/
frontex-expands-its-joint-operation-triton-udpbHP. Accessed 31 May 2016.
22See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Trends Across the Mediterra-
nean: Connecting the Dots, June 2015, p. 1. Available via IOM file:///C:/Users/win/Downloads/
Altai_Migration_trends_accross_the_Mediterranean.pdf. Accessed 31 May 2016.
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2.2 The Novel EU Engagement in Operation Sophia
The adoption of the second edition of the Triton operation was accompanied by the
deployment of an EU novel undertaking at sea. Having regard to Art. 42 of the EU
Treaty and to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, on 18 May 2015 the Council adopted Decision
No. 2015/778 (Council Decision) approving the Crisis Management Concept for
a Common Security and Defense Policy operation.23 This is part of the EU’s
comprehensive approach to migration and, as anticipated in the introduction,
constitutes the military response designated to tackle the business model of migrant
smuggling and human trafficking in the Southern Central Mediterranean.
The Council Decision is a non-legislative act adopted on an intergovernmental
basis by the Council and represents the legal instrument that sets out the purpose of
the mission, its mandate, and other practical information on how Operation Sophia
shall be handled.24 With specific respect to its mandate, the mission aims to
identify, capture, and dispose vessels and assets used or suspected of being used
by smugglers and traffickers. The mission is intended to be conducted in three
sequential phases, and the Political and Security Committee has the power to decide
on the transition between the different phases, subject to the assessment of the
Council.25 Whereas the first phase, which was completed from 22 June to 7 October
2015, was focused on the surveillance and assessment of existing smuggling and
trafficking networks,26 the two subsequent phases involve the exercise of real
enforcement actions against the boats carrying irregular migrants. More specifi-
cally, pursuant to Art. 2 of the Council Decision, Phase 2 consists of two distinct
subphases: (1) a phase that includes “boarding, search, seizure and diversion” of
suspected boats on the high seas (Phase 2—High Seas)27 and (2) a phase that
includes “boarding, search, seizure and diversion” of suspected boats in the terri-
torial and internal waters of Libya (Phase 2—Libyan Territorial Sea).28 Finally, the
third phase, would enable Eunavfor Med forces to “take all necessary measures”
against suspected vessels, “including through disposing of them or rendering them
inoperable,” in the territory of the coastal State concerned, i.e., in Libyan territorial
and internal waters, in its ports, and in its coastal areas.29
23See Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military
Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean, cit.
24For details on the legal framework governing the adoption of Operation Sophia, see Butler and
Ratcovich (2016), pp. 235–259.
25See Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/972 of 22 June 2015 launching the European Union military
operation in the southern Central Mediterranean, Official Journal (2015) L 157/51.
26See Art. 2.2(a) of the Council Decision.
27See Art. 2.2(b)(i) of the Council Decision.
28See Art. 2.2(b)(ii) of the Council Decision.
29See Art. 2.2(c) of the Council Decision.
170 G. Bevilacqua
It is noteworthy that the Operation has obtained an extensive support from EU
Member States. Since the EU cannot rely on any military personnel or weaponry on
its own, the Operation is reliant upon 22 contributing Member States.30 The
Operation’s Headquarter has been established in Rome, and the Rear Admiral of
the Italian Navy has been appointed as the Operation Commander.
Within the field of immigration at sea, whereas the EU remains focused on the
protection of the security of internal and external borders, the target of EU opera-
tions has—at least formally—changed. Indeed, whereas previous Frontex push-
back operations were addressed to irregular migrants as such, the new EU naval
operation in the Mediterranean Sea31 is addressed to migrant smugglers and human
traffickers. Meanwhile, however, the full engagement of the EU in a real salvage
mission remains a missed opportunity.
3 Enforcement Jurisdiction Against Vessels Suspected
of Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking
and the Difficult Transition to Phase 2 into the Libyan
Territorial Sea
Following the political guidance provided by the defense and foreign affair minis-
ters at their informal meetings in September 2015, the EU Council established that
the conditions for Phase 2 of the Operation Sophia were met but only insofar as
actions in international waters are concerned.32 In what follows, we will take a
closer look at the legal framework applicable to Phase 2—High Seas and Phase 2—
Libyan Territorial Sea of the Operation. For these subphases, the Council Decision
stipulates different legal conditions that require distinct considerations and assess-
ments. Notably, when conducting “boarding, search, seizure and diversion” of
suspected vessels on the high seas, naval forces shall act in accordance with the
conditions provided for by applicable international law, including the 1982 United
30The Member States participating to the mission as contributing states are: Belgium, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Slovenia
Sweden.
31Distant from European shores, the first EU naval mission ‘EUNAVFOR’ was launched in the
Gulf of Aden off the Eastern coast of Africa in 2008 in order to combat piracy and armed robbery
at sea. See the EU Council, Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European
Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, 10 Nov. 2008, Official Journal (2008) L301/33. For
doctrine, see Geiss and Petrig (2011), p. 18.
32On 28 September 2015, the Political and Security Committee adopted Decision (CFSP) 2015/
1772 concerning the transition by EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA to the second phase of
the operation, as provided for in point (b)(i) of Article 2(2) of Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 which
also approved adapted Rules of Engagement for that phase of the operation, OJ L 258, 3.10.2015.
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)33 and the Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants.34 Differently, when operating in territorial or internal
waters, foreign naval forces shall act in accordance with any applicable Security
Council Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, i.e., Libya.
With the aim of assessing whether and, eventually, under which conditions
military assets are allowed to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the different
marine zones against vessels suspected of being engaged in migrant smuggling and
human trafficking, the following section identifies and analyzes the legal frame-
work that is applicable both on the high seas (Sect. 3.1) and in Libyan territorial and
internal waters (Sect. 3.2).
3.1 On the High Seas
When sailing at sea, ships are subject to the jurisdiction of their flag State, whose
exercise differs according to the maritime zone in which the ship is sailing.35 As a
ship sails away from a State’s coastline, the extent of jurisdiction shifts in favor of
the flag State, until it becomes exclusive on the high seas. Conversely, as the ship
approaches a State’s coastline, the balance shifts in favor of the coastal State. In this
regard, the basic legal framework is set by the UNCLOS. Its provisions stipulate the
current division in maritime zones and codify States’ jurisdiction, including the
jurisdiction to enforce.36 In particular, as far as the high seas is concerned, the
UNCLOS codifies the following relevant customary principles of international law
of the sea: the principle of the freedom of navigation and the principle of the
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State. On the high seas, by virtue of these
principles, ships are free to navigate37 and are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the flag State,38 and no claims of sovereignty can be validly put forward by any
State.39
In exceptional circumstances, however, pursuant to Art. 110 UNCLOS, “a
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship” may exercise the
boarding of a suspected foreign private ship.40 Excluding the relevance of the
33The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed on 10 December
1982, in Montego Bay, entered into force on 16 November 1994 and was ratified by 165 States as
of 19 July 2013, in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, p. 3.
34For references on the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, cit.
35See Ringbom (2015), pp. 1–454.
36On the provisions of international law of the sea applicable to immigration in the different
marine jurisdictional zones, see Scovazzi (2014), p. 216.
37See Art. 87 of the UNCLOS (Freedom of the high seas).
38See Art. 92 of the UNCLOS (Status of ships).
39See Art. 89 of the UNCLOS (Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas).
40See Art. 110 of the UNCLOS (Right of visit).
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case in which the ship is engaged in piracy,41 the first case of the list laid down in
Art. 110 UNCLOS that deserves attention is the case of “slave trade.”42 In theory,
since trafficking in persons is often referred to as a modern form of slavery,43 this
norm may be used as a specific legal basis for exercising the right to visit against
vessels suspected of this crime. In practice, however, this legal basis may appear
quite weak, at least because the exception concerning ships engaged in slavery trade
has never been used for previous cases of human trafficking yet. Moreover, when
operating at sea, it might be hard to identify and distinguish quickly the cases of
migrant smuggling from the case of human trafficking. Accordingly, it would be
safer to use a stronger legal basis applicable to both criminal phenomena.
In effect, a stronger legal basis may be found in Art. 110(d) UNCLOS, which
considers the case in which there is reasonable grounds for suspecting “that a ship is
without nationality.”44 Since the boats used for irregular migration in the Mediter-
ranean Sea are very often non-registered small vessels without any flag, the
exception concerning the absence of nationality may represent a very useful
instrument for exercising the boarding of the suspected vessels. Furthermore, we
believe that government vessels may also be entitled to act beyond the right of visit.
Article 110 UNCLOS does not explicitly allow the exercise of additional coercive
powers, but at the same time it does not prohibit them.45
The approach taken by the UNCLOS, which is mainly based on the freedom of
navigation on the high seas and on the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, is not
substantially changed by the more recent Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants,46 which is also recalled in the Council Decision.47 Specifically, under
Art. 8(7) of this Protocol, on the high seas the boarding of the suspected ships can
take place only after having received authorization by the flag State, unless the ship
suspected of migrant smuggling is without nationality. In addition, Art. 8(7) stipu-
lates that “[i]f evidence confirming the suspicion is found, [the] State Party shall
take appropriate measures.” Such “appropriate measures” may be interpreted as
those necessary to exercise further enforcement powers in order to act beyond the
boarding of the suspected vessel,48 provided that such powers are exercised “in
accordance with relevant domestic and international law.”49
41See Art. 110(a) UNCLOS.
42See Art. 110(b) UNCLOS.
43See Siller (2016), pp. 405–427; Scarpa (2008).
44See Art. 110(d) UNCLOS.
45See Papanicolopulu (2016), pp. 2–22.
46See Scovazzi (2014), cit.
47The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, cit.
48See Papanicolopulu (2016) cit.
49For a thorough analysis on the criteria for a lawful exercise of the use of force at sea in
accordance with human rights law, see International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The M/V
“Saiga” (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment of 1 July
1999D. For doctrine, see Guilfoyle (2009), p. 268.
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Differently, the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organized Crime,50 is silent on enforcement mea-
sures that can be exercised at sea.
The analysis of the above-recalled international legal framework clarifies that
naval forces that encounter on the high seas a suspected private foreign ship are
justified in boarding it if the flag State of the ship suspected of migrant smuggling or
human trafficking has given its express authorization, if there is reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the ship is without nationality, or when the suspect is of
trafficking in human beings, that is, engaged in slave trade.51
3.2 In Territorial Waters
The launch of the Operation in Libyan Territorial Sea would be extremely impor-
tant as criminals would be intercepted before they depart and, in turn, before they
jeopardize the lives of hundreds of persons. However, while the transition to Phase
2—High Seas was not problematic, conversely the transition to the subsequent
Phase 2—Libyan Territorial Sea is not immune from challenges as the Council
Decision requires either a Security Council mandate or the consent of Libya.
3.2.1 The UN Security Council Resolution
With respect to the first alternative condition required by the Operation Sophia’s
mandate, according to the powers granted by Articles 39 and 42 of the United
Nations Charter (UN Charter), the Security Council may authorize the use of force,
whenever it determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or aggression.”52 The notion of obtaining the support of the United Nations,
in the absence of authorization by the State concerned, is in line with a consolidated
State practice of past decades, according to which UN Member States attempted to
50The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and
Children, cit.
51Even if the analysis in the text is restricted to the international legal framework, it seems worth
noting that with respect to enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas some issues may be raised by
the domestic legal systems which may restrict the jurisdiction against migrant smugglers to the
territorial sea. For doctrine, see Andreone (2011), pp. 183–188. With respect to the Italian system,
more recently, the Supreme Court has affirmed that against ships without nationality encountered
on the high seas, coercive powers can be exercised on the basis of a valid reason, such as art. 8 of
the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants. See Corte di Cassazione, judgment of 23 May 2014,
No. 36052.
52See Articles 39 and 42 of the UN Charter. For doctrine on the powers of the UN Security
Council, see Conforti, Focarelli (2015).
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legitimize unilateral interventions through the label of Security Council resolutions
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.53
On 11 May 2015, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy has officially informed the Security Council of the need for the EU
to work with its support in order to manage the Mediterranean migration crisis.54
The UN bodies, however, have often stressed the importance of focusing the
European action on saving lives when dealing with migration rather than on
military actions.55 The negotiations between the EU and the UN ended with a
strange compromise: with 14 votes in favor and one abstention,56 acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has adopted a Resolution to
maintain international peace and security, condemning, in particular, “all acts of
migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the Libyan
territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the process of
stabilization of Libya and endanger the lives of thousands of people.”57
In the view of the EU institutions, the Resolution “reinforces the authority to
take measures against the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking from the
territory of Libya and off its coast.”58 Conversely, we would minimize the rele-
vance of the Resolution since it is hard to identify the legal rationale behind its
adoption. As requested by Russia at the UN Security Council’s preparatory meet-
ings,59 the mandate of the Resolution covers only the high seas off the coasts of
Libya, rather than the Libyan territorial sea.60 As seen above (Sect. 3.1), in this
marine zone, naval forces can already act against stateless ships in accordance with
the applicable provisions both of the UNCLOS and the Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants.61 Moreover, even though the Resolution may, in theory,
53On the unilateral use of force, see Picone (2015), pp. 3–32.
54See the Council Decision, Rec. 4.
55See, for instance, the speech of the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, at the European
Parliament in plenary session on 27 May 2015. Available via European Parliament News http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150526STO59634/Ban-Ki-moon-on-migration-
%E2%80%9CSaving-lives-should-be-the-top-priority%E2%80%9D. Accessed 31 May 2016.
56The abstention was of Venezuela.
57See Resolution 2240 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7531st meeting, on 9 October
2015, Doc. S/RES/2240 (2015), para. 1.
58On the perspective of the EU, see Political and Security Committee Decision (CFSP) 2016/118
of 20 January 2016, concerning the implementation by Eunavfor Med Operation Sophia of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2240 (2015) (Eunavfor Med Operation SOPHIA/1/2016,
Rec. 3; A similar approach on the Resolution 2240 (2015) is used by the Operation Commander in
the Six Monthly Report, p. 10, cit.
59On the express request of Russia, see the Security Council meeting records adopted at the 7531st
meeting on 9 October 2015, Doc. S/PV.7531 and the Press Release of the Security Council
Resolution 2240 (2015), including Statements after action. Available via United Nations Meetings
Coverage and Press Releases: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm. Accessed
31 May 2016.
60See Resolution 2240 (2015), cit., para. 7.
61See the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, cit.
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extend the possibility to intervene to suspected vessels that fly the flag of a third
State, in practice, according to the current modus operandi of suspected criminals
who act in the Mediterranean sea, the vast majority of the vessels used by them are
stateless vessels.62 Furthermore, the Resolution does not appear to be a blanket
mandate authorizing the use of force as resolutions adopted under Chapter VII
usually are. Indeed, if there is confirmation that the vessels are being used for
migrant smuggling or human trafficking, “all measures commensurate to the spe-
cific circumstances” can be used. This is not an authorization to use “all necessary
measures” in confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers, which was the
wording originally adopted in the initial draft of the Resolution circulated by the
United Kingdom. The unusual expression ultimately adopted in the final version of
Resolution 2240 (2015) is the result of the amendments wanted by some Security
Council Member States concerned that the Resolution could mean, as it namely
means in the language generally used by the Security council, a blanket mandate to
the use of force.63
Allegedly, notwithstanding the adoption of the Security Council Resolution, the
essential parts of Operation Sophia’s mandate risks to remain unaccomplished,
unless Libya decides to authorize the international fight against migrant smugglers
and human traffickers.
3.2.2 The Consent of Libya
The second alternative route identified by the Council Decision consists of the
consent of Libya. In this respect, the legal analysis revolves around the principle of
territorial sovereignty. The boarding, search, seizure, and diversion activities
envisioned by the Operation’s mandate are, indeed, enforcement measures that
may involve the use of coercive powers.64 The exercise of such powers by foreign
authorities may interfere with the fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty.
This principle of general international law is codified also by the UNCLOS. The
latter specifically provides that States have full sovereignty within their territorial
waters, which may extend up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines.65 In this
marine area, the coastal State enjoys the exclusive right to exercise coercive powers
just like on the territory of the mainland. Accordingly, the principle of territorial
62On the question of jurisdiction over suspected vessels, see Papastavridis (2016b).
63See Vote on a Resolution on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling in the Mediterranean.
InWhat’s in Blue. Insights on theWork of the UN Security Council, 8 October 2015. Available via
What’s in Blue http://www.whatsinblue.org/2015/10/vote-on-a-resolution-on-human-trafficking-
and-migrant-smuggling-in-the-mediterranean.php. Accessed 31 May 2016.
64See Art. 2 of the Council Decision.
65See Articles 2–4 of the UNCLOS.
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sovereignty does not allow for other States to participate in this exercise, unless
expressly authorized.66
The EU has been seeking to obtain the consent to enter Libyan territorial sea, but
up to now Libyan authorities did not appear as willing to provide such authoriza-
tion. The international relationships are clearly complicated by the fact that since
2014, Libya has been facing a grave political crisis and, as a consequence of such
crisis, Libyan authorities lack the capacity to effectively control their territory, as
well as their territorial sea.
The current political scenario may probably change in light of the recent UN-led
formation of a government of national unity, which, according to the Security
Council Resolution 2259 (2015), is the sole legitimate Government of Libya.67
Accordingly, only this government would be considered by the International
Community as the authority legitimate to authorize the entry into Libyan territorial
waters for the purpose of disrupting the business model of migrant smuggling and
human trafficking. This legal option may find support in a precedent case and,
specifically, in the context of the international response to maritime piracy in
Somalia. Over 20 years, Somalia has lacked any functioning institutions or any
form of political control of the territory, to the extent of being defined by the
literature as the locus classicus of a failed State.68 In 2004, after nearly 2 years of
insidious negotiations and numerous international attempts to deal with the problem
of the crisis of sovereignty, a provisional transition federal government (TFG) was
formed. The latter was a highly precarious body held together artificially by the UN
and, at the same time, the sole Somali government recognized by the International
Community. Likewise, in Libya, the political instability of Somalia contributed to
the fervent and atrocious resurgence of a violent crime, i.e., maritime piracy. In
order to address this phenomenon, the TFG (replaced in 2012 by the new Somali
Authorities) explicitly asked for international assistance.69 In light of this request
and thus in light of the TFG’s consent, a number of Security Council resolutions
were adopted to ensure the implementation of the rules of international law
concerning coercive powers against piracy on the high seas also in the territorial
sea and even on the mainland of Somalia.
66For a thorough analysis on the relevance of the State’s consent, see Wippman (1996), p. 209;
with specific reference to the coastal State’s consent in the context of piracy in Somalia, see Treves
(2009), p. 406; Tancredi (2008), p. 937.
67See Resolution 2259 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7598th meeting, on
23 December 2015, Doc. S/RES/2259 (2015), para. 3.
68For a reconstruction of the Somali crisis, for doctrine see Gordon (1997), pp. 903–974; Kreijen
(2004), p. 65 ff.; for case-law see European Court of Human Rights, Sufi and Elmi vs. United
Kingdon, Apps. No. 8319/07 and 11449/07, concerning the appeal by two Somali citizens at risk of
inhumane treatment if returned to Mogadishu.
69According to paragraph 9 of Resolution 1816 (2008) ‘the authorization set out in paragraph 7’
has been provided only following receipt of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the
Somalia Republic to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council dated 27 February
2008 conveying the consent of the TFG’. Similar formulations, referring to further letters con-
veying the consent of the TFG, are in Security Council Resolutions 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008).
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It is probably bearing in mind the Somali precedent that the Operational Com-
mander states in the above recalled Six Monthly Report on Operation Sophia that
“In order to move to phase 2 in Libyan territorial waters, we need firstly an
invitation from the GNA [Government of National Accord], as the sole legitimate
Government of Libya under UNSCR 2259 (2015), and secondly a UN Security
Council Resolution to provide the necessary legal mandate to operate”.70
4 Between the Need and the Obligation to Turn into
a Rescue Scheme
At the current state of play, following Operation Sophia’s entry into Phase 2—High
Seas, criminals suspected of migrant smuggling and human trafficking appear to
enjoy less freedom of maneuver. The geographical limits of the Operation forced
them to act in the Libyan territorial sea where, however, they may act uncontrolled
as national authorities are not capable to prevent and repress their criminal actions.
And while alleged smugglers and traffickers are remaining within the national
borders, smuggled and trafficked persons are left on unsafe boats with limited
food, water, and, above all, insufficient fuel to reach anywhere further than 30–50
nautical miles from the Libyan coast.71
By consequence, Operation Sophia is often turned into a salvage mission.
According to the Six Monthly Report, as of 31 December 2015, military forces
have completed the rescue of more than 8336 persons, initiated both by detection of
boats in distress by military assets or by request from the Rescue Coordination
Centre in Rome.72 Also in 2016, the Operation is often turned into a rescue mission
that saved hundreds of migrants at sea while they were attempting the Central
Mediterranean route to Europe.73
The relevance of the duty to render assistance is expressly recalled both in the
Council Decision and Resolution 2240 (2015). Specifically, Recital (6) of the
Council Decision74 stipulates that the Operation shall be conducted in accordance
with international law and, in particular, with the relevant provisions of the
UNCLOS, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS Convention),75 and the
70See the Six Monthly Report, section on Legal mandate—UNSCR and Libyan Invitation, p. 19.
71Ibid, Section on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) Evolution, p. 7. For a description of
the conducts of smugglers and traffickers, see also Cataldi (2015), pp. 1498–1502; in particular,
the author examines the decision of the Italian Supreme Court, Criminal proceedings against
Radouan Hai Hammouda, No. 3345, 23 January 2015.
72Ibid, Section on Phase II.A (High Seas) Activities, p. 11.
73On more recent news, see EU External Action: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eunavfor-med/news/index_en.htm (5/16).
74See Council Decision, cit.
75The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, adopted 1 November 1974, in force
25 May 1980; 1184 UNTS No. 1861.
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Maritime SAR Convention,76 which include the obligation to assist persons in
distress at sea. More intensively, the Security Council affirms “the necessity to
put an end to the recent proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by, the
smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the
coast of Libya”77 and urges Member States and regional organizations to render
“assistance to migrants and victims of human trafficking recovered at sea, in
accordance with international law”.78
In light of the above, even though Operation Sophia was created as a military
mission, its naval assets, when encountering people boats in distress at sea, have a
positive obligation to rescue them. Several international treaties include provisions
relating to a duty to render assistance at sea. The prevalence of treaties has been
ascribed in part to the quite old but still well-known sinking of the Titanic, which
raised demand for international cooperation in safety matters. The most widely
applicable treaty rule, however, is Art. 98 of the UNCLOS:
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without
serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of
their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him;
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers
and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry
and the nearest port at which it will call (emphasis added).79
According to this provision, every flag State must require the master of a vessel,
whether a State or private vessel flying the State’s flag, to proceed with all possible
speed to the rescue of persons in peril when informed of their need for assistance or
whenever there is reasonable grounds for retaining that they are threatened by a
grave and imminent danger. This obligation is applicable to all vessels, and
assistance must be provided to any person regardless of the nationality or status
of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found. Although this
article is located in the UNCLOS section on the high seas, the duty to rescue applies
in all maritime zones.80 It is closely connected with the principle of safety of life at
sea, which is the only real limit to the freedom of navigation on the high seas.
Accordingly, and because of its repetition in treaty and domestic law and in State
76The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, adopted 27 April 1979, in force
22 June 1985; 1405 UNTS No. 23489.
77See Resolution 2240 (2015), cit. preamble.
78IbId, para. 3.
79See Art. 98 UNCLOS.
80Among others, on the content of the duty to rescue at sea, see Pallis (2002), pp. 329–364;
Trevisanut (2010), p. 523.
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practice, the duty to render assistance is generally recognized as a principle of
customary law binding on all States.81
5 The Search for Clarity on the Place of Safety
Undertaking rescue operations does not exhaust the duty to render assistance. In this
context, it is important to emphasize that this duty is only fully met if the rescued
persons can disembark in a place of safety. In other words, following their rescue,
survivors shall be conducted to a safe place. This complementary aspect seems
implicit in the logic of any rescue attempt, which is to save lives. In practice,
however, the prompt identification of a place of safety where irregular migrants
rescued at sea can be disembarked is often quite problematic. The main challenge
derives from the fact that while the obligation of States to rescue people at sea is, as
seen above, a long-established rule of international customary law codified in a
number of treaties, for disembarkation purposes a comparable binding provision
does not exist in the law of the sea.
During the general revision of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO)
SAR system, the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) faced the problem of
where rescued persons can and should be disembarked, without distinction based on
their legal status, nationality, or place where they were found.82 The MSC adopted
two Resolutions that entered into force on 1 July 2006 and amended the
abovementioned SOLAS and SAR Conventions. In particular, following the
amendments to these Conventions, people rescued at sea must be promptly
conducted to a “place of safety,” which is defined as follows:
[. . .] a place where the survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic
human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met. Furthermore, it is a
place from which transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final
destination.83
According to the renewed SAR regime, making available a place of safety is the
responsibility of the State in whose SAR zone the survivors are rescued.84 This rule,
however, does not mean that this State or the intervening State is automatically
obliged to disembark recovered people on their own territories.85 In theory, survi-
vors can also be disembarked in a third country that is willing to receive them. In
81Ibid.
82See Tondini (2012), p. 59; Trevisanut (2010), cit.
83IMO-Maritime Safety Committee ‘Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea’ (MSC
Guidelines) art 6.12 Resolution MSC.167(78) (20 May 2004) www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
432acb464.html.
84Ibid Art. 2.5.
85On the obligation to render assistance at sea and on the responsibility for failing to save lives, see
Papastavridis (2016a), pp. 31–47.
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practice, if compared to “ordinary” situations of distress at sea, the fact that the
people in question are mainly represented by a large amount of undocumented
migrants, refugees, and/or asylum seekers does not facilitate the disembarkation
procedures. The combination of “irregular migrants” on the one hand and “distress”
on the other hand tends to generate questionable dynamics of burden avoidance and
burden shifting between States.86
While the amendments to the SAR and SOLAS Conventions decided by the
IMO were aimed to guarantee assistance to rescued persons and, at the same time,
to minimize negative consequences for the rescue vessel, it is clear that in practice
the disembarkation burdens rest primarily upon the warship’s flag State, with the
SAR coordinating State concurring. When the latter is unable or unwilling to find a
proper place of disembarkation, it is the warship’s flag State that in the end must
find an appropriate solution to the stalemate.87
In the current context of the Mediterranean migration crisis, the international
practice and discussions around the follow-up of rescue operations at sea show how
the SAR regime is under pressure due to the fact that the State accepting disembar-
kation is bound to assume responsibility of asylum seekers and to manage the presence
of other migrants, with an irregular status as far as entry and stay are concerned. As
Operation Sophia’s assets are incidentally engaged in rescue operations, the legal
issues relating to the prompt identification of a place of safety to disembark survivors
rescued at sea assume renewed relevance. The key legal question we wish to focus on
hereinafter concerns the criteria that can and should be applied to establish disembar-
kation procedures in the case of SAR interventions carried out by Eunavfor Med naval
forces on the high seas and, eventually, in the Libyan territorial sea.
5.1 On the High Seas
In the Council Decision, the above-recalled Recital (6) stipulates that survivors
must be delivered to “[. . .] a place of safety, and to that end the vessels assigned to
Eunavfor Med will be ready and equipped to perform the related duties under the
coordination of the competent Rescue Coordination Centre.”
The generic rule entailed by the Council Decision is in line with the generic
wording used in the Six Monthly Report in the section on “Cooperation with EU
organizations and Agencies.”88 In this section, the Operation Commander clarifies to
have with Frontex “a general agreement and specific operational Procedures”. Such
cooperation with Frontex led to the adoption of the operational coordination struc-
tures that have been formalized by means of an exchange of letters on 14 July 2015
86For an analysis of the disputes of Mediterranean States with regard to SAR operations, see
Trevisanut (2010) cit.
87See Tondini (2012), p. 62, cit.
88The Six Monthly Report, p. 14.
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and the subsequent adoption of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on
30 September 2015. The cooperation with this Agency shall cover, among other
aspects, “the procedures for disembarkation in a place of safety.” Furthermore, in the
following section on “Cooperation with the Italian Authorities,”89 the Operation
Commander adds that “EUNAVFOR Med must comply with the EEAS (2015)
885 guidance to follow the TRITON Operation Plan for the disembarkation of
persons rescued at sea.” In addition, likewise generic is the official news reporting
on Eunavfor Med rescue interventions. It refers to disembarkation either in Sicily
ports or in an undefined place of safety.90
However, as far as we may understand from both the Council Decision and the
Six Monthly Report—the EEAS (2015) 885 guidance is not publicly available—we
presume that by virtue of this cooperation with Frontex and Italy, Eunavfor Med’s
operational plan and SOPs are in compliance with Triton’s operational plan. The
latter, in turn, must comply with the above-recalled Sea Border Regulation, which
governs Frontex joint operations and includes specific modalities for the disembar-
kation of persons (intercepted or) rescued in a maritime operation.91 On this basis,
we deem that the Sea Border Regulation applies also to disembarkation procedures
undertaken within Operation Sophia’s interventions on the high seas.
For a number of reasons, our interpretation would be well desirable. First, this
Regulation expressly contemplates the specific case in which border surveillance
operations at sea turn into rescue interventions. For these cases, recalling the
content of the duty to rescue, provided for by Art. 98 UNCLOS, the Regulation
stipulates as follows:
[. . .] every State must require the master of a vessel flying its flag, in so far as he can do so
without serious danger to the vessel, the crew or the passengers, to render assistance
without delay to any person found at sea in danger of being lost and to proceed with all
possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress. Such assistance should be provided
regardless of the nationality or status of the persons to be assisted or of the circumstances in
which they are found. The shipmaster and crew should not face criminal penalties for the
sole reason of having rescued persons in distress at sea and brought them to a place of
safety.92
Second, when people are rescued, pursuant to Art. 10(c) of the Sea Border
Regulation, the responsibility of the operational decision shall be shifted to the
host State, which—both for Triton and Eunavfor Med operations—is Italy. This
decision must be adopted in accordance both with the principle of non-
refoulement93 and the specific disembarkation modalities that would prevent
89The Six Monthly Report, p. 15.
90On more recent news, see EU External Action http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eunavfor-med/news/index_en.htm. Accessed 31 May 2016.
91See Regulation 656/2014, Art. 10.
92See Regulation 656/2014, Rec. 14.
93On the broad interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement, see the European Court of
Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, cit. For a comment, see Liguori (2012), p. 415. For
doctrine on the implementation of the principle of non refoulement at sea, see Trevisanut (2008),
pp. 205–246.
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naval units from transferring people (intercepted or) rescued at sea in a place where,
inter alia, there is a serious risk that they would be subjected to the death penalty,
torture, persecution, or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or
where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion,
nationality, sexual orientation, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.94
Third, pursuant to Frontex’ Annual Report on the implementation of the Sea
Border Regulation, with respect to 2014, since handover and disembarkation in
third countries were not foreseen in Triton’s operational plan, “[a]ll the migrants
intercepted or rescued were disembarked in Italy.”95
At the time of writing, the subsequent Frontex Annual Report concerning the
implementation period of 2015 has not been published yet. However, from the
cross-checked analysis of the puzzle of documents above recalled, we would
conclude assuming that irregular migrants rescued on the high seas during SAR
operations carried out within the Operation Sophia are disembarked in Italy, which
may be considered a safe place.
5.2 In the Libyan Territorial Sea
Our interpretation is less optimistic if Phase 2—Libyan Territorial Sea begins. In
this respect, while the Council Decision does not contain any specific information
regarding how EU military forces shall act with irregular migrants saved by
Sophia’s units when the Operation patrols will begin to operate within Libyan
territorial waters, from the Six Monthly Report emerges the idea that such forces
shall interact and cooperate with the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard. In more detail,
the Report clarifies that, if requested and if the operational mandate is amended,
Eunavfor Med will provide Libyan forces operating at sea with capability and
capacity building. Initially, this interaction in Libyan territorial waters would
include Libyan “cooperation in tackling the irregular migration issue,” with the
expectation that at a later point in time “Libyan authorities could take the lead in
patrolling and securing their Territorial Waters, with support being provided by
EUNAVFOR Med.”96
The illustrated scenario seems to be inspired by the bilateral agreements con-
cluded by Spain with a number of States in Northwest Africa, including Morocco,
Senegal, Mauritania, and the Cape Verde, which stipulate joint sea patrols of the
Spanish Coast Guard and the border authorities of the partner States and which
94Ibid, Regulation 656/2014, Rec. 13.
95See Frontex’ Annual Report on the implementation on the EU Regulation 656/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of
the external sea borders. P. 7.
96See the Report, section Capacity and Capability Building, p. 20.
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intend to prevent people boats from exiting the territorial sea of the latter States.97
These agreements have been highly instrumental in closing the Atlantic migration
route to the Canary Islands and continental Spain and have raised questions, among
the other aspects, about the sharing of responsibilities between the various States
involved in relation to the handover of intercepted migrants.98
Bearing in mind the issues raised by these arrangements, we fear that similar
arrangements may be concluded with third States that may not be qualified as a safe
place in accordance with the SOLAS and SAR Conventions and/or as a safe third
country in accordance with the customary principle of nonrefoulement.99 Our fear,
in particular, concerns the possible cooperation with Libya. In this regard, Frontex’s
past experience with the Triton Operation proves that Libyan authorities are not
ready to cooperate. According to the abovementioned Frontex Annual Report, the
Italian Rescue Coordination Center received several distress calls from people
boats in Libyan SAR zone and even though the Triton operational area was
extended up to the SAR regions of Italy and Malta, every attempt to communicate
with Libyan SAR authorities was always denied.100
This may be probably explained once again by the above-recalled political crisis
that has existed in Libya since 2014. Due to this crisis, in many parts of the State,
Libyan authorities lack the capacity to effectively control the territory. They are
basically omitting to adopt measures capable to prevent and repress on their
territory a wide range of serious violent threats such as the rising trend of terrorist
groups in Libya proclaiming allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(also known as Da’esh) and the continued presence of other Al-Qaida-linked
terrorist groups and individuals operating in Libya.101 Also, the area of Tripoli
and its ports, from which most smugglers and traffickers depart, are subject to
dangerous militias. Additional concerns regarding stability in Libya and in the
Region derive from the uncontrolled proliferation of unsecured arms and
ammunition.102
Our conclusion is accordingly that the legality of SAR activities in Libyan
territorial waters will depend on how rescued migrants will be processed and
97The agreements themselves are confidential. See for an extensive analysis Garcia Andrade
(2010), pp. 311–346.
98Ibid.
99This principle of non-refoulement appears in several central instruments of international law.
See, among others, Art. 33(1) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (opened for
signature 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) and Art. 3(1) of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (opened for signature
4 February 1985, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 (CAT).
100See Frontex Annual Report, p. 7.
101On the use of force against terrorism and other violent activities of non-state actors in
acquiescent States, see Tancredi (2007), p. 969 ff.
102On these grounds, the Security Council has affirmed that ‘the situation in Libya constitutes a
threat to international peace and security’. See Security Council Resolutions 2213 (2015) and 2238
(2015), cit.
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where they will be disembarked. EU Member States operating within Operation
Sophia would necessarily be exercising effective control over migrants when
operating unilaterally or jointly with Libyan forces within Libyan territorial waters,
and EU Member States would therefore be bound by SAR regime and the non-
refoulement obligations. Moreover, this time it is hard to imagine that the Sea
Border Regulation will be further geographically extended. Its provisions, indeed,
are remarkably silent on SAR interventions in the territorial sea of third States, even
though in earlier policy documents the intention was to clarify the scope of Member
State powers also in respect of operations in the territorial sea of third countries.103
6 Concluding Remarks
When Frontex was created, the core of its mandate was described rather broadly as
rendering “more effective the application of existing and future Community mea-
sures relating to the management of external borders.”104 Over the years, in the
wake of frequent embarrassing shipwrecks, the EU approach vis-a-vis the phenom-
enon of immigration by sea has been slowly evolving toward the respect of
migrants’ fundamental rights and the inclusion of SAR activities in Frontex join
operations.
With Operation Sophia, the idea was to adopt a new strategy. In addition to
Frontex joint operations—which nevertheless remain primarily focused on border
management—the EU is now committed to a military mission, having the specific
goal of disrupting migrant smuggling and human trafficking routes and capabilities.
In effect, these transnational organizations play a crucial role in the current esca-
lation of migratory movements toward Europe. But, even if illegally, the fact is that
they represent the sole route available to escape hunger, civil wars, and other
unimaginable situations in their countries of origin.
The extraordinary situation in the Mediterranean led also the Security Council to
intervene and, specifically, to make use of the powers granted by Chapter VII of the
UN Charter in order to authorize Member States and international organizations to
use enforcement jurisdiction against irregular migration on the high seas.105 With
regard to this maritime zone, however, States are already provided with sufficient
coercive powers by virtue of the applicable international legal framework, includ-
ing Art. 110 UNCLOS and Art. 8 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants. Therefore, what is currently really needed to activate what is deemed
to be the crucial phase of Operation Sophia is the consent of an effective Libyan
government.
103See COM(2006), 733 final, par. 34. For doctrine, see M. den Heijer, “How the Frontex Sea
Borders Regulation avoids the hot potatoes”, cit.
104See Reg. 2007/2004, Art. 1(2).
105See Resolution 2240 (2015).
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The recent UN-led formation of a government of national unity may slowly go in
this direction. In fact, based on the readiness expressed by the President of the
Presidency Council of the Libyan Government of National Accord to cooperate
with the EU, the latter went ahead with the militarization of the waters off the coast
of Libya.106 Last June, the Operation Sophia’s mandate was extended until 27 July
2017 with two additional assignments: the assistance in the development of the
capacities and in the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforce-
ment tasks and the implementation of the UN arms embargo107 on the high seas off
the coast of Libya. Meanwhile, however, while both the EU and the UN remain
focused on fighting criminal networks, it persists the primary humanitarian need of
saving migrants’ lives at sea. This old problem affected and affects many coastal
States in the world. Already in the mid-1970s, for instance, many boat people fled
from the communist regime in Vietnam. By the end of the 1980s, the number of
people fleeing Vietnam was increasing and, in parallel, the willingness of host
States in the region to offer protection and of third countries outside the region to
offer resettlement was declining.108 In the context of the Mediterranean migration
crisis, the need to render assistance to migrants in danger at sea is unfortunately
more evident by frequent mass drownings. This is an urgent need and also a positive
obligation binding on all States.
Against this factual and legal backdrop, both Frontex and Eunavfor Med oper-
ations, even if initially and primarily focused on different objectives, have inciden-
tally turned into rescue operations. This reaction is certainly appreciated under a
humanitarian perspective. But, facing the increasing number of deaths at sea, we
hardly understand the reasons why SAR interventions are still adopted incidentally,
rather than officially and on a regular basis. The rescue of irregular migrants at sea,
indeed, requires the adoption and the implementation of an appropriate legal
regime. From the chapter arises the importance of relying on clear and transparent
criteria to govern operational decisions concerning the disembarkation of rescued
migrants in a safe place. The crossed interpretation of a number of EU legal and
operational documents on Operation Sophia led us to argue that to SAR interven-
tions on the high seas applies the Sea Border Regulation. Should our interpretation
be correct, each operational decision to establish the place of disembarkation would
106See the Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 June 2016 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/
778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean, OJ L 162/18
of 21 June 2016.
107On 14 June 2016, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 2292 (2016) on the arms
embargo on Libya, expressing in particular concern that the situation in Libya is exacerbated by
the smuggling of illegal arms and related materiel. Pursuant to this Resolution, Member States are
authorized ‘to inspect [. . .] on the high seas off the coast of Libya, vessels bound to or from Libya
which they have reasonable grounds to believe are carrying arms or related materiel to or from
Libya [. . .]’. With previous resolutions, the Security Council has imposed, modified and reaffirmed
the arms embargo in Libya. See resolutions 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 2009 (2011), 2040 (2012),
2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2174 (2014), 2213 (2015), 2214 (2015) and 2278 (2016).
108Coppens and Somers (2010), pp. 377–403.
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be taken by the Italian Rescue Coordination Center. The latter shall act and decide
in compliance with the migrants’ fundamental rights and the disembarkation pro-
cedures laid down in the Regulation itself. Nevertheless, we stress that this is only a
presumption, a desirable presumption that would need to be confirmed by official
sources.
Lack of clarity concerns also the possible activation of Phase 2—Libyan Terri-
torial Sea. After a number of mistakes, however, we cannot forget the negative
effects of the patrol agreements between Spain and a number of States in Northwest
Africa, the difficult experience of Triton with Libyan authorities, and, above all, the
grave political situation in Libya. Against these factors, the intention to cooperate
with Libyan enforcement authorities is induced to skepticism in terms of possible
violations of the legal framework on the identification of a safe place in accordance
with the UNCLOS, SOLAS, and SAR Conventions and/or a safe third country in
accordance with the principle of nonrefoulement.
An extensive application of the Sea Border Regulation to every operation of the
EU and its Member States must be more intensively considered together with an
extensive cooperation with more stable and reliable States.
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